This paper examines the causes of the crisis in Indonesia and seeks to explain why its effects have been so much more devastating than in the other ASEAN countries. Indonesia has had financial crises before but this one had a regional character: a sudden collapse of confidence of the footloose intemational short-term capital that took fright. The economic fundamentals were, in retrospect, much less stronger that they seemed.
In his national day speech on 16 At the same time, the exchange rate has been remarkably stable since October, at around Rp7,500 to the US dollar, Usually the weakening of the rupiah is related to political uncertainty. The stable rate, however, has been the result of very thin trading in the foreign exchange market, of just some tens of millions of dollars, compared to the normal pre-crisis daily turnover of a billion dollars or more. The conversion of IMF and other aid funds into rupiah to finance the government budget, running at more than a billion dollars a month, was able to sustain the exchange rate. Meanwhile, the rate of inllatiory rneasured on a mo.nthly basis, has come down quickly, although the annual figure will still be close to the earlier projection of 80%. The question now is how long such monetary stability will last in the absence of a political solution. The Soesatro and Basri (1998) and World Bank (1998) .
